G7dlpCC0YzLv_msIAIg10mt5Wyqhr1JPCNWsyU/mtime:1479526380/sites/default/files/reuters/usa-election-trump-flynn_1.jpg' alt='Us Army Harvard Strategist Program' title='Us Army Harvard Strategist Program' />Clausewitz and His Worksby Christopher Bassford. TABLE OF CONTENTSVersion 8 MAR 2. Since the close of the Vietnam War, the ideas expounded by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz 1. American military writing doctrinal, theoretical, and historical. His book On War published posthumously in Prussia as Vom Kriege in 1. Us Army Harvard Strategist Program' title='Us Army Harvard Strategist Program' />Naval War College in 1. Air War College in 1. Army War College in 1. It has always been central at the U. S. Armys School for Advanced Military Studies at Leavenworth founded in 1. The U. S. Marine Corpss brilliant little philosophical field manual FMFM 1 Warfighting 1. Of Auction Bridge Card Game there. On War with a heavy maneuverist flavoring from Sun Tzu, and the more recent Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications MCDPs, c. Clausewitzs basic concepts. This is not the first time Clausewitz has been in fashion. Indeed, On War has been the bible of many thoughtful soldiers ever since Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke attributed to its guidance his stunning victories in the wars of German unification 1. Nor is it the first time that individual American soldiers and military thinkers have been attracted by his ideas George Patton, Albert Wedemeyer, andespeciallyDwight Eisenhower were intensely interested in what he had to say. Our website is the source for the latest security and strategic research from the militarys link to the academic community. The Strategic Studies Institute is the. It is, however, the first time that the American armed forces as institutions have turned to Clausewitz. While the philosopher had insisted that war was simply the expression of politics by other means, the traditional attitude of American soldiers had been that politics and strategy are radically and fundamentally things apart. Strategy begins where politics end. Nebuchadrezzar II The second and greatest king of the Chaldean dynasty of Babylonia reigned c. He was known for his military might, the splendour. Hazami Barmada Hazami Barmada has 12 years of experience as a public affairs, communications and social impact strategistconsultant, social entrepreneur and. Weeks after the US Army told personnel to immediately shelve all drones made by Chinese manufacturer DJI, citing unspecified cyber vulnerabilities associated with. All that soldiers ask is that once the policy is settled, strategy and command shall be regarded as being in a sphere apart from politics. The sudden acceptability of Clausewitz in the wake of Vietnam is not difficult to account for, for among the major military theorists only Clausewitz seriously struggled with the sort of dilemma that American military leaders faced in the aftermath of their defeat there. Clearly, in what had come to be scathingly called a political war, the political and military components of the American war effort had come unstuck. It ran against the grain of Americas military men to publicly criticize elected civilian leaders, but it was just as difficult to take the blame upon themselves. Clausewitzs analysis could not have been more relevant The more powerful and inspiring the motives for war. On the other hand, the less intense the motives, the less will the military elements natural tendency to violence coincide with political directives. As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character. When people talk, as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence. If the policy is rightthat is, successfulany intentional effect it has on the conduct of the war can only be to the good. If it has the opposite effect the policy itself is wrong. Many of Americas soldiers found unacceptable any suggestion that they had failed on the battlefield, but they were willing to admit that policy had been badly made and that they had misunderstood their role in making it. They believed that, by clarifying the interplay among the armed forces, government, and people and by clearly describing the two sides of the civil military relationship, Clausewitz offered a way out of this dilemma and into the future. This is why versions of Clausewitzs ideas underlie the most influential statements of the military lessons learned from the Vietnam debacle Colonel Harry Summerss seminal On Strategy A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War and the Weinberger doctrine, first expressed by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1. With the West victorious in the Cold War and the superb showing of the American military in the 1. Gulf War, some of the steam went out of the American military reform movement. There was a natural tendency for soldiers not only to suggest that these victories showed that the problems had been fixed but to imply that there really hadnt been much of a problem in the first place. Accordingly, the study of Clausewitz started to wane somewhat and all the usual arguments for his obsolescence resurfaced. However, the failure of much of the new, non Clausewitzian military thinking in the wake of American offensives after the atrocity of 1. September 2. 00. 1 then led to the customary re revisions. Clausewitz is very much back in stylewith new attention to his thoughts on peoples war, the inherent power of the defense, etc. But this new fashionability applies mostly to civilian and military scholars, not to Americas military institutions. The latter tend to labor under the delusion that Clausewitzs ideas on war are not relevant to topics like LIC, COIN, and insurgency a notion that would have puzzled practical insurgent warfighters like Mao and Giapboth strong proponents for the study of Clausewitz. Such recent developments help to justify the study of Clausewitz to the contemporary American security professional, but there are far deeper reasons to read his works. Clausewitz was much more than a strategist he was a historian and a historical philosopher, a political theorist, and a practical soldier of wide experience. His thought runs like a subterranean river through all modern military thought. We find it in the Marxists, Leninists, and Mao Zedong, in Colin Powell, among political scientists like Samuel Huntington and Robert Osgood, in the writings of military historians like Hans Delbrck and of navalists like Sir Julian Corbett, as well as in the doctrines of Air. Land Battle and Warfighting. As the German general Jacob Meckel said well before World War One, everyone who nowadays either makes or teaches war in a modern sense, bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if he is not conscious of it. Ivt Bluesoleil Bluetooth Driver Windows 7 here. Kalashnikov Battery Charger Manual. This is even truer now than it was then. National security professionals are therefore obliged to become familiar with the concepts of this most influential of military thinkers. Given the admitted difficulties of digesting Clausewitzs massive and sometimes overpowering tome, however, most readers evidently feel compelled to look for some more cost effective method of accessing his insights. The bibliographies of books on military history and theory are full of works that seek to explain or condense Clausewitzs theories. Some are more successful than others. A few are brilliant. Nonetheless, a word of warning is necessary here No second hand description of Clausewitzs ideas is really acceptable as a substitute for his own work, for none can capture the richness and complexity of his great theoretical work, On War. Its form and method are at least as important as its content. Reducing On War to a set of bullet points deprives the reader of its principal valuei.